Goncharenko’s Peace Plan: How to End the War, Step by Step

I am writing this in Kyiv in early October 2026. Bridges in the city are partially closed. Energy infrastructure, businesses, warehouses and data centres are coming under attack. For the first time in a century, Ukraine has gone an entire week without producing a single tonne of steel. In 2014, 95 children were born in Kyiv every day. In 2026, that figure is 44.

This is today's REALITY.

It is uncomfortable to acknowledge. It is far more reassuring to hear about strength, unbreakable resolve and resilience. But you cannot cure an illness you refuse to recognise. That holds true in medicine and in politics alike. Acknowledging reality gives us a chance to improve it, however modestly.

We are losing people on the front line, in cities behind the lines that come under attack, and at the border, as people leave and never return. We lack the resources of our own even to keep the state functioning, let alone to finance the war. We are losing businesses and our economy. And each successive set of terms offered to us is worse than the last.

What should we do?

Lie down in a grave and wait to die?

Wait for Russia to choke on its own atrocities, for the black swan to appear and for the "Swan Lake" to play?

Or pursue peace and try, step by step, to improve our position?

I believe we should choose the third option. Below, I will try to explain how.

What is our strategy?

We spend a great deal of time dissecting Russia's strategy: how its plan to "take Kyiv in three days" failed, how it shifted to a war of attrition and now seeks to wear us down.

Very well. But what is our strategy?

If we examine it honestly, the list looks something like this. To believe in a miracle. To wait for a wonder weapon that will change everything. To wait for Russia to collapse of its own accord. To wait for NATO to come. And while we wait, to keep fighting. For how long? Till the end. Till the last Ukrainian.

The authorities are searching for a "wunderwaffe" that will solve all our problems. Having our own ballistic missiles would be good. But Russia has had ballistic missiles throughout the war, and we have not surrendered. Why should our missiles make Russia surrender? Finding a way to counter jet-powered drones would also be good. But Russia will develop new ones, and we will once again have to find a response. The cycle continues, each turn costing us thousands of lives and leaving destruction in its wake.

The Ukrainians possess a certain fondness for mysticism. We place our faith in signs, in miraculous salvation, and in the comfort that we shall somehow 'muddle through.' Yet the world is an unforgiving place. In reality, good people perish, and 'wonder weapons' arrive a day late and a dollar short, if they materialize at all.

So let us speak about objectives rather than faith. For me, there is one overriding objective now: to save as many Ukrainian lives as possible. Negotiate wherever agreement is possible. Be cunning where cunning is necessary. Apply pressure wherever we can. All in pursuit of peace on the most favourable terms possible for Ukrainians.

Neither side can win

Of course, Russia is to blame for all of this. Of course, Putin is a deranged man with blood on his hands. I understand that as well as anyone.

But.

The battlefield currently sits in a state of relative parity. Ukraine remains a resilient nation, populated by a stoic people and defended by a formidable army that stands unbroken after five long years of conflict. Yet, Russia is likewise holding its ground: its economy remains functional, reinforcements continue to flow, and its capacity for adaptation matches our own. The Russians have already made it abundantly clear that they are prepared to expend a million of their own men, or indeed, two million, without a second thought.

We cannot defeat Russia. Russia cannot defeat us.

In a war of attrition, however, no such parity exists, and we are steadily losing ground. They wage war on their own coin; we subsist on the treasury of others. With each passing month, we forfeit our factories, our infrastructure, and thousands of irreplaceable lives, alongside thousands more who flee our borders, unlikely ever to return. Time, quite simply, is not on our side.

If victory eludes both combatants, negotiation remains the sole alternative.

I use that word deliberately: negotiation. Not capitulation. Not surrender. An agreement requires concessions from both (!) sides. I understand how painful that is. But we are adults. We can see what is happening and where it is leading.

The time has come for a sober, unvarnished conversation with the public. We must finally offer them the truth. We have had quite enough of the empty slogans regarding our strength, our unbreakable resolve, and our resilience.

How It Would Work

Why has nothing worked so far? Because every attempt has sought to secure a grand, "lasting" peace all at once: a single document that would resolve everything: territory, security, sanctions, prisoners and guarantees. But Ukraine and Russia currently have neither trust, nor the necessary mechanisms, nor common ground on the central issues. Under these conditions, a comprehensive agreement is impossible.

Yet our inability to agree on everything does not mean that we cannot agree on anything. If one comprehensive agreement is impossible, we must conclude a series of smaller ones.

Instead of a single negotiating table, there should be multiple, narrowly defined negotiating tracks running in parallel. Each should have its own subject, timeframe and guarantor. If one track breaks down, the others continue. Moscow would no longer have a single switch with which to bring down the entire process.

Take infrastructure. An immediate agreement to halt all strikes is unrealistic today. But an agreement to stop attacks on schools is possible. I believe it could even be relatively straightforward. Hospitals would come next. Then bridges. Then railways and residential buildings. Step by step, we would work towards a complete halt to attacks on infrastructure.

Every small agreement that is honoured provides something we currently lack altogether: a record of compliance. That, in turn, can serve as the foundation for broader agreements.

At this stage, I see the principal objectives as follows:

1. Maritime security: without access to the sea, our economy will collapse altogether.

2. Energy: cold weather is approaching, and people need heating and electricity.

3. Infrastructure: bridges, railway stations, schools and hospitals.

4. The front line: gradually restricting hostilities to the Donbas alone.

In essence, this means de-escalation at sea, in the air and on land. Each of these broad areas can be divided into dozens of smaller ones.

The Peace Triangle

How, then, do we negotiate when previous attempts have failed? This brings us to the most important point.

For every agreement, however small, we construct a triangle. Ukraine and Russia occupy two of its corners. The third is occupied by a country, or several countries, acting as guarantor of that particular agreement.

The third party must meet three conditions simultaneously: it must have real leverage over Russia; it must have Ukraine's trust; and, most importantly, it must stand to benefit from the agreement and lose out if it breaks down.

That final condition is crucial. Trust between Ukraine and Russia will not return for generations, at the very least. Interests, however, already exist, and it is on those interests that we must build these agreements.

Consider the Black Sea. Russia gains security for its shipping. Ukraine gains security for its shipping and restores the exports without which our economy cannot survive. Türkiye gains busy ports, inexpensive energy supplies and greater regional influence. Ankara also has leverage over Moscow: the straits, the Middle East and the transit of Russian energy supplies.

All three benefit, allowing such an agreement to hold without us having to police it every day. We do not trust Putin. We trust Ankara's ability to calculate its financial interests.

The more stakeholders involved in the triangle, the stronger the agreement. If the Kremlin breaks it, it risks damaging relations with countries it has every reason to avoid antagonising.

This would change Ukraine's very role. For years, we have been told to become Europe's shield, its defensive wall, its steel porcupine. I propose that Ukraine should instead become a crossroads: a place where the interests of half the world converge, and where the whole world comes to negotiate.

Sooner or later, a shield will shatter. A crossroads is protected by everyone who uses it.

Who would provide guarantees, and what would they gain?

A similar logic applies to energy. Nuclear safety is first and foremost a matter for the International Atomic Energy Agency: its inspectors are physically present at the plants, and both sides recognise its mandate. Germany, France, the United States, Japan and China should act as political guarantors, since a nuclear power plant accident could potentially affect them too. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar could assume responsibility for guarantees concerning the transit of energy supplies. For them, this would offer geopolitical influence and an opportunity to establish a substantial presence in the European market.

Aerial attacks would be a negotiating track for the United States, the EU and China. China needs transit routes for its goods. The Americans need their businesses to be protected from attack. Europe needs the war finally to end. Within this track, there could be much narrower agreements – for example, on schools and nurseries, mediated by Switzerland, Austria and, again, China.

On land, the situation is more difficult. Only a country to which Moscow genuinely listens can bring hostilities to a halt and guarantee the separation of forces. At present, that country is China. It needs overland transit to the EU and security for its investments, neither of which is possible without a stable and predictable front line. This would mean fixing the line of control without granting it legal recognition. Demining could be undertaken by Croatia and Cambodia, which have faced this challenge themselves and developed demining expertise into an export industry, alongside Japan, with its technological capabilities, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

Then there is the separate humanitarian track: prisoners, deported children, missing persons and civilian hostages. The Vatican, the UAE, Qatar and the International Committee of the Red Cross are active in this area. Their reputations are at stake. For the Vatican, it is also an opportunity to demonstrate its importance at a time when its global influence is declining. It could also help with religious matters.

That leaves security and reconstruction. I see the size of the armed forces and the absence of foreign troops as a negotiating track for northern Europe: Poland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Baltic states and the United Kingdom. A strong, properly funded Ukrainian army protects their borders above all. Reconstruction, meanwhile, could be undertaken by a coalition of China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and the EU in exchange for preferential investment terms, rather than relying on reparations that Moscow will never pay voluntarily. In my view, it is better to engage those who wish to profit from our recovery than to spend years waiting for money from a country that has no intention of paying.

Look at that list. It encompasses half the world, and everyone stands to gain something. But only if Ukraine survives, develops and is no longer at war.

On sanctions

Now to the most contentious issue.

What Russia wants at this stage of the war is clear: the lifting of sanctions on its energy exports, allowing it once again to earn revenue freely from oil and gas.

But let us consider what is happening around us. Foreign businesses are gradually returning to Russia. European components are still being found in Russian missiles. The Americans want cheap energy.

At the end of September, the EU removed Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from its sanctions list. France, our closest friend, as we are repeatedly told – had sought Usmanov's removal. Journalists report that Paris secured the release of a French citizen in return.

France, in other words, did not abandon sanctions as a policy. It identified its own interest and reached an agreement. What we received, meanwhile, were words of support and sympathy.

The fact is that, for many of our partners, money matters more than values. Sanctions on Russia will begin to be lifted, one way or another. The only question is whether we will receive anything in return.

Perhaps, then, we should avoid being naïve and try to turn this to our advantage. Ukraine itself could propose a phased lifting of sanctions on Russian energy exports in exchange for an end to all long-range strikes, the lifting of the Black Sea blockade, and the restriction of hostilities to the section of the front in the Donbas. Each step towards sanctions relief would follow, and only follow, a corresponding step implemented by Russia. If strikes resume, sanctions would be automatically reinstated.

What would we gain? We would preserve what remains of our economy. We would protect Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv and Dnipro. We would save thousands of lives. We would halt the exodus from the country.

The downside is equally clear: Russia would have more money to finance the war. But after five years of sanctions, it still has sufficient funds. Unfortunately.

The same approach could apply to more limited issues. Moscow clearly dislikes our strikes on its oil refineries. Very well: we could propose that we refrain from striking Novorossiysk in exchange for Russia refraining from striking Odesa. An unfavourable exchange? Then let us find another. What matters is that the search for agreements should be continuous and become the defining principle of our negotiating strategy.

What we will have to discuss

To begin a conversation, we must send a signal. Here, we must return once again to REALITY.

Are we being admitted to NATO? And if we are admitted, will NATO come to our aid in the event of war? Unfortunately, you know the answers as well as I do.

Ukraine's army is now the strongest on the continent. No one but ourselves can defend us. That is why I believe we can begin discussing neutrality. The terms can be negotiated. Cooperation with NATO would continue as it does now. Rearmament would continue. A joint European budget would be established to sustain our armed forces, with guarantees provided by the countries that need our army to protect their own borders.

For an entire nation to perish in pursuit of NATO membership that no one is offering us is, in my view, absurd.

Then there are the questions of language, the Church and historical memory.

On language, the situation is as follows. The Europeans are already requiring us to bring our language legislation into line with European standards on minority languages. Have no doubt: Parliament will vote for these changes, because without them there will be no EU accession. The same provisions could apply to the Russian language. Ukrainian would remain, as it is today, the language of the state, education, science and culture. But we have large Russian-speaking cities, and their residents are no less patriotic than anyone else. These are precisely the cities being bombed every day. Russian speakers are not persecuted in Ukraine, and there is no intention of persecuting them.

Religious questions are not resolved in one, two or five years. They take generations. The Church is about faith, love and kindness towards one's neighbour. We have the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Greek Catholics and many Protestants. Freedom of conscience is the norm in Europe. If someone wishes to attend a church affiliated with Moscow, let them. The state must simply ensure that such churches preach about God, rather than betrayal of the country. And the state is capable of doing so.

On historical memory, we have already shown that we can reinterpret monuments rather than simply tear them down. Kyiv's Mother Ukraine Monument (Bat'kivszchyna-Maty), for example, has retained its relevance as a genuinely powerful symbol. Monuments to the Unknown Soldier can likewise be reinterpreted. In most towns and villages, these commemorate local people who died in the war.

People write to me saying that this contradicts the principle of "Army, Language, Faith". I disagree. In my view, it is precisely the fulfilment of that principle. Only a Ukraine that survives can maintain a strong Army, nurture its Language and preserve its Faith.

The Donbas

The most difficult question is the Donbas.

The mistake in previous attempts was to begin there. If a conversation becomes deadlocked over the most painful issue from the very first minute, it ends before it has truly begun.

We should discuss the Donbas once we have already reached agreements on many other matters.

Once we have stopped attacks on schools.

Once we have stopped attacks on hospitals.

Once we have stopped attacks on ports.

Once we have stopped attacks on residential buildings.

Once we have stopped attacks on bridges.

Once we have confined hostilities to the Donbas alone.

By then, we will have a record of agreements being honoured, and guarantors that have invested in peace and will not want to lose it. We can then seek a workable formula. A halt to hostilities along the line of contact. A neutral zone. The withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. An area under UN control. There are options.

Fixing the line of control would not, in itself, constitute legal recognition. History offers ample precedents. The Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union for half a century, yet the United States and most Western countries never recognised their annexation. West Germany never accepted the division of the country as permanent. In both cases, time ultimately favoured those who survived and endured.

We must begin with small steps and gradually work towards a complete end to hostilities. I see no other way.

The objections I hear

The objection I hear most often is that Russia does not want to negotiate. At present, that is indeed the case. It has an advantage in drones, a more stable economy, and has not even declared a general mobilisation. But no party is entirely without wants or interests. Everyone has interests of their own. Prisoner exchanges have continued throughout the war, and they work. There have also been several local ceasefires. Compliance was imperfect, but they were observed. The withdrawal of Russian forces from the outskirts of Kyiv in the spring of 2022 was made possible above all by our soldiers, but the agreements reached in Istanbul also played a part. Can we agree to stop attacks on schools? Yes. On grain carriers? Yes. On churches? Yes. Our task is to keep identifying areas where we have an interest, and they are willing to talk.

The second objection is that this amounts to capitulation. It does not. To describe any negotiated agreement as capitulation is absurd. Capitulation is when there is no longer any negotiation.

The third objection is that there was already a grain agreement, and Russia withdrew from it. Yes, it did. To me, that is precisely an argument in favour of this plan. At the time, there was only one negotiating track, which Moscow could use as leverage to extract concessions elsewhere. When there are dozens of tracks, each backed by its own guarantor, withdrawing from an agreement means antagonising Ankara, Cairo and Riyadh simultaneously. The cost is altogether different.

The fourth objection is: "China is Russia's ally. How can it act as a guarantor?" But we need precisely the kind of guarantor to whom the Kremlin will listen. If Moscow can disregard a guarantor, that guarantor guarantees nothing. Confidence in Beijing's role would rest on its own interests. The war harms China's transit routes to Europe and its investments. Beijing honours agreements where it is in its interest to do so. We must therefore make peace serve those interests.

And fifth, there are the Minsk agreements. I am not ashamed of them. Our team acted wisely at the time. Ukraine survived as a state and, over those years, built the army that halted the invasion in 2022. But Minsk had one major flaw: it was a single, overarching agreement whose guarantors had too little at stake and were therefore insufficiently effective. That was not how it had been envisaged; it became apparent as the process unfolded. Russia managed to disregard that agreement. Disregarding a hundred smaller agreements, each with different guarantors, would be far more difficult.

For every Ukrainian

I want the very best for Ukraine. My children and I live here. That is precisely why my position differs from that of those who call for us to fight until victory, whatever the cost.

Let me put it this way. Some view this war through the eyes of a historian, in terms of sweeping historical narratives. That perspective, too, is necessary.

I look at it through the lives of individuals: a mother in Kharkiv, a father in Odesa, a grandmother in Lviv, a grandfather in Uzhhorod, a child in Vinnytsia.

For me, Ukraine's development means enabling all these people to be happy and live in peace. It means businesses being spared destruction and private enterprise being allowed to flourish. It means producing steel, manufacturing machinery, flying into space and building nuclear power plants. It means publishing Ukrainian-language books in print runs of millions, rather than treating a print run of five thousand as a success, as we do today.

Alongside history, there is geography. Unfortunately, we cannot change it. Russia will not disappear from our map, and we will have to live alongside this neighbour. It will be difficult and painful, but we will have to live on.

The essential condition for all of this is peace.

That is why I favour negotiation. Not on everything at once, and not on the basis of trust that does not exist, but on the basis of interests that do. Through guarantors that stand to benefit from peace. Step by step.

A thousand small agreements will pave the way for a comprehensive peace agreement.

That is how we will fight for every Ukrainian, rather than to the last Ukrainian.

Oleksii Goncharenko, people's Deputy of Ukraine, Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)