A former brick seller, a Navalny supporter, holidays in Crimea: the Rosatom employees who helped occupy the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant
On the night of 6-7 June 2026, a Russian attack drone struck a nuclear waste storage facility in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone. A few years ago it would have been hard to imagine attack drones flying over the site of the world's worst nuclear disaster, let alone targeting nuclear facilities. Fortunately there was no spent nuclear fuel inside the damaged building, and radiation levels reportedly remained within normal limits.
This wasn't the first attack on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. In February 2025, a similar drone damaged the New Safe Confinement – the structure that covers the destroyed reactor 4 – and Russian drones now fly over the Exclusion Zone on an almost daily basis.
In fact, Russia's campaign of nuclear terror began on the very first day of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On 24 February 2022, Russian forces seized the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. They were assisted in the occupation by Rosatom, the Russian state-owned corporation responsible for nuclear energy development, generation and research.
In this article, which has been written in conjunction with our partners at the Book of Executioners project, we revisit how events unfolded at Chornobyl during the early weeks of the full-scale invasion. We also reveal what we have learned about some of the Rosatom employees who helped the Russian forces during the occupation of the plant.
"Kyiv in three days"
Reactor 4 at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant is only about 10 km away from the Belarusian border as the crow flies.
The first Russian troops arrived at the plant shortly after 15:00 on 24 February 2022. They entered through Checkpoint No. 2 and made their way towards the spent nuclear fuel storage facility SNFSF-1. It was nearly 16:00 when Russian armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and a tank reached the administrative building.
One of those who entered the building was Russian police colonel Andrei Frolenkov, then deputy commander of the Arsenal special forces unit of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) in Bryansk Oblast. He was soon joined by Major Sergei Burakov, head of the Special Purpose Centre for Rapid Response Forces and Aviation, who is believed to have commanded the occupation contingent during the seizure of the plant.
Following negotiations, the Ukrainian National Guard personnel stationed at the plant were forced to surrender, since engaging in combat on the grounds of a nuclear power plant posed a significant risk of a nuclear incident.
The plant effectively became a logistics hub for Russian forces moving through the area. Meanwhile, staff in the Exclusion Zone continued to work extended shifts and prevented the uninvited "guests" from accessing key facilities.
On 9 March 2022, the plant lost external power after an attack damaged the electricity grid. The Russian occupation forces proposed connecting Chornobyl to the Belarusian grid, but the plant's engineers opted instead to rely on diesel generators.
Meanwhile, the senior officers at the plant were being rotated. In the early weeks of March, Burakov was replaced by Major General of Police Oleg Yakushev, deputy commander of the Siberian District of the Russian National Guard. He effectively became the self-appointed commandant of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant.
Also present at the site was Major General Alexei Rtyshchev, head of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection (RCBP) Troops of Russia's Eastern Military District, who was responsible for resolving the plant's electricity supply problems.
Later, Sergei Maltsev, head of a department within the Office of the Chief of Russia's RCBP Troops, arrived at the Chornobyl plant.
Colonel General Alexei Bezzubikov, deputy director of the National Guard, visited the site towards the end of the occupation to present awards to the Russian soldiers.
Our partners have also established that Russia deployed National Guard units from Dzerzhinsk, Zarechny, Balakovo and Dimitrovgrad to guard the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant.
When they retreated, Russian forces stole over US$135 million worth of equipment from the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone. In addition to computers, dosimeters and vehicles, they took servers away with them, and the Central Analytical Laboratory lost a spectrometer worth €6 million and several chromatographs.
The software required to operate the stolen equipment remained in Ukraine, nuclear safety and atomic energy expert Olha Kosharna told Ukrainska Pravda. Moreover, each device had been fitted with a tracker that enabled it to be remotely deactivated, so the Russians were unable to use the equipment they had looted.
The occupiers also took vehicles used for transporting radioactive waste, as well as fire engines that had been transferred to the Exclusion Zone during the major wildfires of 2020.
Most importantly, when they withdrew, the Russian occupation forces took 169 members of Ukraine's National Guard into captivity. Six of them remain imprisoned in Russia to this day.
On 4 April 2022, after Russia's withdrawal from the Exclusion Zone, Police Colonel Frolenkov was awarded the title of Hero of Russia, presumably for his role in the occupation of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant.
Training with Rosatom
It is not possible to capture a nuclear facility without prior preparation. In conversations with staff at the plant, the Russians openly boasted that they had seized the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant with relative ease. One reason for that, they claimed, was that they had rehearsed the operation in advance at a facility with a nearly identical layout – the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant in the city of Kurchatov. Ironically, this is the very plant that Russian milbloggers imagined Ukrainian forces would capture during Ukraine's Kursk operation.
The Kursk Nuclear Power Plant entered service in 1976, just one year before the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant was commissioned in 1977. A comparison of aerial photographs reveals striking similarities in the layout of the two facilities. You can even see the same type of ventilation stack that Chornobyl used to have before the New Safe Confinement structure was installed.
Furthermore, until recently the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant operated exclusively RBMK-1000 reactors – the same type used at Chornobyl. So it is entirely plausible that the facility was used as a training ground for the Russian occupation forces.
Our partners have established that such exercises did in fact take place in 2021. Among other scenarios, Russian forces rehearsed the seizure of a nuclear power plant under the command of the aforementioned Police Colonel Frolenkov. He was assisted by personnel from the RCBP Troops of Russia's Eastern Military District, who were supervised by Colonel Ruslan Tikhomirov.
Shaun Burnie, senior nuclear specialist at Greenpeace Ukraine, who has researched Russia's occupation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, told Ukrainska Pravda he has received information from multiple sources confirming that such exercises took place, most likely in early winter 2021.
"The information available to us indicates that the exercises were conducted in January 2021. We attempted to obtain additional evidence using satellite imagery, but due to adverse weather conditions and heavy cloud cover during that period, the images were not particularly informative," Burnie said.
A Rosatom representative known as Nikolai Nikolayevich later described these exercises to Vitalii Popov, one of the plant's employees. According to Popov, he openly boasted that the Russian military had used the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant to plan every step of the seizure of the Chornobyl facility.
Information obtained by our team also suggests that Nikolai Nikolayevich headed the group of Rosatom representatives who entered the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant.
The Russian occupation forces are known to have brought a number of highly specialised experts with them. Their primary task appears to have been to advise the Russian commanders during the operation.
Despite the similarities between the Kursk and Chornobyl nuclear power plants, there was one critical difference: the territory of the Chornobyl plant was radioactively contaminated. The Russians therefore needed experts who could explain which actions were safe and which should be avoided. They also needed guidance on where within the Exclusion Zone troops could be stationed without risk to their health.
But the five weeks of Russian occupation demonstrated that either the military ignored their advisers or the experts failed to do their job properly. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why the Russian troops would dig trenches in the Red Forest, one of the most radioactively contaminated areas in the Exclusion Zone.
Volodymyr Falshovnyk also recalls incidents involving radioactive contamination. He was the shift supervisor who, on 20 March 2022, volunteered to travel from Slavutych to Chornobyl to relieve some of the staff who had been working for 25 days without a break.
"The Russians wanted to wash their vehicles on the plant's premises," Falshovnyk recalled in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda. "We suggested several suitable locations, but they rejected all of them because they were outside the immediate territory of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Instead, they set up a makeshift car wash next to the repair workshops, where the rank-and-file Russian soldiers were also living. During one of our routine inspections, we detected a contaminated area there."
Falshovnyk added that after discovering the contamination, he contacted the Russian military, who sent a specialist named Dima – a young man responsible for radiation safety who was an academic and had gained a PhD in 2021. After inspecting the site together with Chornobyl's radiation monitoring specialists, the Russians shut down the car wash.
A second incident occurred later, when Russian troops stationed near the Red Forest began entering the plant's administrative buildings, bringing radioactive mud in on their boots. The plant's staff had to decontaminate the affected areas after them.
Falshovnyk recalls that to resolve any issue, he had to approach either the military representative known by the alias "90th" – whom our partners have identified as Oleg Yakushev – or the aforementioned Nikolai Nikolayevich. According to Falshovnyk, the latter wielded considerable authority and boasted that he was equal in rank to some of the commanders leading the occupation contingent.
Nikolai Nikolayevich
The Ukrainian investigation has identified "Nikolai Nikolayevich" as Nikolai Nikolayevich Mulyukin. Since 2016, he has been deputy general director for security at the Leading Design and Research Institute of Industrial Technology, a Russian joint-stock company involved in the construction of nuclear, hydroelectric and thermal power plants.
In April 2024, he was served a notice of suspicion by Ukrainian police for violating the laws and customs of war, specifically for participating in the looting of not only the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant but the entire Exclusion Zone.
The investigation established that Mulyukin had assisted the Russian forces by compiling lists of the equipment worth removing from the Exclusion Zone. He had also instructed the Russian soldiers on how specific pieces of equipment should be dismantled.
As for his rank, our partners have established that Mulyukin had previously served in the Russian police and retired with the rank of major general. Oleg Yakushev, whom we mentioned before, held the same rank. So it is not surprising that the plant's staff had to resolve their issues primarily through these two men.
Falshovnyk recalls that on one occasion a section of piping needed to be replaced as part of scheduled maintenance, but it was impossible to do it independently. Every movement had to be coordinated because the Russians had stationed guards and snipers throughout the facility. Following negotiations with the occupation command, a date and time for the work were approved, the Chornobyl staff were assigned an armed escort, and only then could the planned maintenance begin.
Falshovnyk also remembers that Rosatom staff occupied the KVANT building, which housed the radiography equipment and electrical workshops. The Russian nuclear specialists took over the third floor, and the shift supervisor maintained direct communication with them via a wired telephone line. The KVANT building is connected by a glass corridor to the Chornobyl administrative building, where the plant's shift supervisors were likewise based on the third floor. As a result, they would regularly see both Russian officers and Rosatom employees walking past throughout the day.
"They even came to use the showers on our floor, so the corridor looked like a public thoroughfare," Falshovnyk recalls.
From time to time, Mulyukin himself would stop by his office. On one occasion, Falshovnyk complained to him about one of the Russian generals (presumably Yakushev) who kept insisting that the Russian forces were saving Ukraine from "fascists and Banderites".
"More than half the people working our shift were actually born in Russia – in the Urals, Leningrad Oblast, or Kursk Oblast. We literally showed him a list of names and asked where exactly they were looking for fascists if half the staff had the same origin as them. After that conversation, the Russians took offence and stopped talking to us," Falshovnyk says.
He also recalls another interesting detail: the Russians promised they would not hit the city of Slavutych while the plant staff promised to continue performing their daily duties.
But on 25 March, Falshovnyk learned that Russian forces were engaged in fighting near the city. He immediately contacted Mulyukin. The Chornobyl employees informed him that they would refuse to work unless the Russian troops withdrew from Slavutych.
"Mulyukin said he needed half an hour to clarify the situation. He disappeared for about thirty minutes and then came back, saying that officially there were no Russian troops in Slavutych. I have no idea who he spoke to or who he clarified the matter with," Falshovnyk recalls.
Slavutych Mayor Yurii Fomichov later remembered that the Russian presence in the city had indeed been minimal: Russian troops entered the city, found no Ukrainian military forces there, and left shortly afterwards.
When the Rosatom staff eventually departed, Mulyukin did not even say goodbye. Falshovnyk had no opportunity to see him one last time. On 31 March, Russian forces began transporting the captured Ukrainian National Guardsmen away from the plant. Upon learning this, Falshovnyk used the plant's loudspeaker system to announce that the Russians were taking the POWs away.
Moments later, Russian soldiers burst into his office, ordered him not to touch the telephone, forbade him to leave the room and stationed armed guards outside. And for the rest of the day, the Chornobyl shift supervisors were forced to remain at their desks at gunpoint.
Falshovnyk also recalls that the Russians had promised not to harm the National Guardsmen. However, after a ceremony at which they received awards from a Russian general – most likely Bezzubikov – they were ordered to transport the Ukrainian servicemen into captivity in Russia. Clearly Mulyukin either could not influence the decision or chose not to. He left the Exclusion Zone together with the occupying forces.
"Guests" from Moscow and the Kursk and Leningrad Nuclear Power Plants
As of spring 2026, the identities of five Rosatom representatives known to have been present at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant in March 2022 have been established. They were identified in no small part thanks to the plant's CCTV cameras, which repeatedly captured the individuals discussed below during the occupation.
One of them was Nikolai Mulyukin. To complete his profile, it is worth noting that he lives in the town of Balashikha, outside Moscow, and has purchased land to build a dacha (country house) in the village of Tabolovo in the Volokolamsk district. He owns an extensive collection of vehicles and has been regularly involved in road accidents, yet – according to official records at least – he has never been found to be at fault.
Mulyukin has hundreds of thousands of roubles in various bank accounts. He holidayed in the Crimean resort of Alushta after the Russian occupation, and in 2018 he also travelled to Cyprus.
Another "guest" from Moscow who took part in the occupation on behalf of Rosatom was Alexander Dorofeyev. He heads the Russian project office responsible for establishing the Unified State System for Radioactive Waste Management. It is likely that his area of responsibility at Chornobyl included the radioactive waste facilities that the Russian troops were supposed to be guarding – or, alternatively, areas they should not have approached at all.
Falshovnyk recalls, for example, that the Russians never managed to gain access to the liquid and solid radioactive waste processing facility located in the plant's main complex, or to Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facilities (SNFSF) Nos. 1 and 2. They did attempt to enter SNFSF-1 on 31 March, as they were fleeing the site, but the automated security system rejected the access pass they tried to use.
Dorofeyev is known to live in Moscow, in an apartment that he likely purchased with a mortgage. Like Mulyukin, he has several hundred thousand roubles in various accounts, amounting to more than two million roubles in total. In 2021 alone he earned RUB 8 million (over US$100,000) working for Rosatom.
Dorofeyev began his career in the 2000s with a Rosatom contractor, the Sosny Research and Production Company, which develops equipment for the nuclear industry and is based in Dimitrovgrad, where he lived for some time. He also got into financial difficulties related to loan repayments and was subject to court-enforced debt recovery proceedings.
After leaving the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone, he travelled to Türkiye twice, in June and July 2022, visiting both Istanbul and Ankara. In 2023, he also flew to Kaliningrad.
Yan Ivanov is an operator at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant and was one of the youngest Rosatom representatives at Chornobyl: he was 30 at the time of Russia's full-scale invasion.
He hails from a dynasty of nuclear workers: both his father and mother were employed at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. Ivanov lives in Kurchatov and earned more than RUB 1.5 million (approximately US$19,200) in 2021. He works at Reactor Unit No. 1 as a reactor refuelling engineer and maintains an active presence on social media and streaming platforms.
Perhaps the most striking detail, however, is that Ivanov appears to support the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), the Russian non-profit organisation founded by opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Yet that did not prevent him from taking part in the occupation of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant.
Valery Polyakov is Ukrainian by birth. He was born in the town of Bilopillia, Sumy Oblast, and obtained Russian citizenship in 2000. He now lives and works in Kurchatov and has been an operator at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant since at least 2010, having joined the facility in the early 2000s. In 2021, he earned RUB 1.8 million (about US$23,100) while employed by Rosatom. He has held modest bank deposits and similarly modest debts, and has frequently changed his phone number.
The last Rosatom employee known to have participated in the occupation of Chornobyl is Maxim Prishchepa. Unlike his colleagues, he arrived in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone from Leningrad Oblast, from the village of Sosnovy Bor, which is next to the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant. He is believed to have been responsible for technical matters at the Chornobyl facility.
According to leaked Russian databases, Prishchepa began his career at Rosatom in 2008 as a fitter. Up until then he had been self-employed, manufacturing bricks and slate roofing, driving a taxi, renting out garages, and engaging in both wholesale and retail trade. His mother has worked as a cleaner at the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant since 2006.
In 2021, like his colleague Valery Polyakov, he earned around RUB 1.8 million while working at the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant. He also has several hundred thousand roubles in bank deposits.
It's important to note that it was no coincidence that the representatives from the Kursk and Leningrad nuclear power plants turned up in Chornobyl. Both facilities operate – or operated – RBMK reactors, and both have experience of decommissioning them.
The Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant shut down its first RBMK reactor in December 2018 and its second in November 2020. The Kursk Nuclear Power Plant permanently shut down its first reactor in December 2021. It is therefore reasonable to assume that other, as yet unidentified Rosatom employees may also have come from these facilities, as they had practical experience of working with decommissioned RBMK-1000 reactors.
One final point deserves emphasis. The number of Rosatom staff deployed to Chornobyl was far too small for them to have run the nuclear power plant independently. However, they included highly specialised experts who were capable of supervising the Ukrainian staff who remained at their posts. That was all the Russians needed: convinced they would "take Kyiv in three days", their objective was simply to install their own management at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and rely on the existing Ukrainian workforce to keep the facility running.
Rosatom has never actually denied that some of its employees were present in the Exclusion Zone. But the Russian state corporation has sought to preserve its international reputation by downplaying its role. In mid-March 2022, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported, citing a Rosatom statement, that the Russian specialists were merely "advising" the staff at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and were in no way part of the occupying military contingent.
The criminal case against Nikolai Mulyukin tells a different story. According to the notice of suspicion, Rosatom representatives arrived at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant on the afternoon of 24 February 2022 – the very same day and at virtually the same time as the invading Russian troops. As a representative of Russia's state nuclear corporation, Mulyukin remained at the occupied plant from the first day of the invasion to the last, leaving only on 31 March 2022.
Fortunately, Russia's occupation of the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone lasted only five weeks. Had it continued longer, events might well have unfolded according to the scenario later seen at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
During the first six months of the occupation in Zaporizhzhia, Russian control over the Ukrainian workforce remained relatively weak. But following the sham referendums organised by the occupation authorities, employees came under increasing pressure to sign new contracts with the Russian state nuclear corporation. Those considered insufficiently loyal were arrested – often on accusations of "opposing the special military operation" [as Russia refers to the war against Ukraine] – and transferred deep into Russia. They were gradually replaced by successive waves of Rosatom staff.
But that is another story – and one that we will certainly tell in due course.
Research into the identities of the Russian nationals present at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant was conducted with the assistance of the Book of Executioners project and investigative journalist and open-source intelligence (OSINT) researcher Liubomyra Remazhevska.
Stas Kozliuk, Ukrainska Pravda
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska
Edited by Teresa Pearce