"We are not solving the key problem": what prevents Ukrainian forces from holding Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad and Dobropillia

Why is this article worth reading?

Firstly, this is the first detailed piece about the reasons behind the formation of the Dobropillia salient and the current situation there.

Secondly, their breakthrough towards the town of Dobropillia and their reaching villages in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast has become the culmination of Russia's 2025 summer offensive. Soon this offensive will develop into an autumn one (not only in terms of the calendar, but also by the nature of hostilities) – Russia has brought in new forces, particularly naval infantry. The Russians still have about one and a half months of warm and dry days left, during which the most active advances usually take place.

Thirdly, the war – both for Ukraine's very existence and for the determination of the borders within which it will endure – continues. At present, Ukrainian forces are holding several of the last defensive lines of Donetsk Oblast – Lyman and Sviatohirsk, the Kramatorsk area and the Pokrovsk area, where the heaviest fighting is taking place. Beyond these lines lie the liberated parts of Kharkiv Oblast and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which has hardly been affected by the large-scale war.

On 6 August, at the command and observation post of a unit operating on the Pokrovsk front, Ukrainska Pravda heard sharp complaints about the organisation of defence on one section of the front. They came from the highest-ranking officers in this unit.

The complaints concerned the then leadership of the Pokrovsk Tactical Group under Colonel Maksym Marchenko, which demanded that troops be moved into positions that had either already been lost or could no longer be supplied.

Meanwhile, two Ukrainska Pravda sources from this unit, with whom we spoke at length in the headquarters, said that the command ignored the fact that the Russians were infiltrating the rear and even killing Ukrainian soldiers at remote positions.

Marchenko apparently refused to acknowledge the critical situation, while most brigade and unit commanders at the Tactical Group meetings were forced either to remain silent or to agree with him.

One of the two sources told us: "At the meeting I say that according to the data already entered into Delta [Ukraine's situational awareness and battle management system], the enemy is clearing house by house, and I am told: 'There is no enemy there, just one and a half cripples, it's nothing'. Marchenko looked at one of the commanders: 'So, is there an enemy in settlement N?', and he replied: 'No, there isn't'. It was clear that everyone believed in an illusion.

Individually, everyone at that meeting was well-placed to give the true picture. But when they came to a meeting with Marchenko, a collective mind emerged, and no one was willing to assess themselves or the enemy soberly. Everyone continued to believe that we could plug a nearly 9-km gap through which the enemy was advancing."

Both our sources occasionally broke into a hoarse cough from the dampness in the basement.

"They have a paper map on which all the positions are marked as ours. Because if they mark them as being under the Russians, they might get scared," the source added.

In the first minutes of the conversation, it seemed to us that they were speaking about Pokrovsk itself, which the Russians had infiltrated in mid-July and where they attacked isolated Ukrainian servicemen.

But this story was about something different.

On 11 August, five days after our conversation at the command and observation post, DeepState, a Ukrainian group of military analysts, updated its interactive map of hostilities and showed the problem that was unfolding in parallel with the Russian infiltration into Pokrovsk – the Russian breakthrough towards Dobropillia. The length of the entire salient, from the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka road to the farthest point reached by the Russians, grew from about 15 to 25 km.

In an interview with The New York Times on 22 August, DeepState founders Ruslan Mykula and Roman Pohorilyi said they had hesitated about whether to publish information about the breakthrough towards Dobropillia. At that time, it could have weakened Ukraine's negotiating position.

The tips of this "claw", as drawn by DeepState, or "rabbit's ears", as some soldiers nicknamed them, almost reached one of the main logistical arteries of the whole of Donetsk Oblast – the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk road (the exact landmark being the village of Zolotyi Kolodiaz). At that time, it was still used by both military and civilians. It was an ideal road in terms of both military and civilian logistics – straight and with good asphalt.

After the DeepState map update, the Dnipro Operational Strategic Group of Forces, which is responsible for almost the entire active front, tried to reassure the public. They claimed that "a small group of about 5-10 Russians made their way there […] This does not mean that they have taken control of this territory." General Staff spokespersons were more specific and admitted that the Russians were "trying to move" towards Zolotyi Kolodiaz with "several small groups" and "infiltrators".

Yet a month later, when the Azov Corps – which had taken over the defence of the Dobropillia front from the Pokrovsk Tactical Group – reported on the situation, it turned out that more than 3,000 Russian troops, supported by tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery, were operating there…

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the counteroffensive operation of Ukrainian forces on the Dobropillia salient as "an important success for Ukraine" that thwarted the Russians' plans, and also reported that seven settlements had been liberated from the Russians.

To find out what really happened, what the current situation on the Dobropillia salient is (spoiler – it is more complicated than it seems), and which cities are at risk due to the expansion of this salient – read on.

Lost time

At first, the Dobropillia salient did not look as catastrophic as DeepState depicted it on 11 August. In fact, at its beginning it was not even "Dobropillia", but rather a nameless salient, a wedge gradually expanding between two key cities, Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka.

This salient began to be formed in May 2025, when Russian forces crossed the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka road in the area of the villages of Malynivka, Nova Poltavka and Novoolenivka and began to move rapidly north.

"We realised the situation was worsening," recalls a marine officer, "when four or five Russian armoured vehicles drove straight through our neighbours' positions across the highway into Malynivka – without any resistance at all. Everything had long been collapsing there, but no one was doing anything about it."

"The 117th Brigade was stationed there, and it lacked personnel," added a source from one of the corps. "While they were on lighter fronts, they still held on, but when the Russians pushed forward in May, they began to lose positions – Nova Poltavka, Rusyn Yar. And in the summer, it got even worse – they were losing positions one after another."

After crossing the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka road, the Russians, using the long ravines that typify the terrain, advanced northwards – towards the settlements of Shevchenko Pershyi, Koptieve, Novotoretske and Shakhove. Every time it rained, when drones could not fly, they used it to move their positions. In this way, the Russians kept stretching its salient further.

By the end of July, the Dobropillia salient had grown so much that it had formed a semi-circle from the east around the Ukrainian grouping of troops in the two major cities – Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

At that time, one of the company commanders stationed south of Myrnohrad approached Ukrainska Pravda with a request to publicise the risk of the semi-encirclement of at least three brigades, which the higher command was ignoring. By then, the Russians were already 1.25 km away from the main supply road to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad – the Dobropillia-Pokrovsk road – and were making incursions into the village of Rodynske, located on this route.

Two weeks remained until the DeepState map update that showed the 10-km breakthrough.

"We did not expect them to move so quickly north and start cutting even the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk road," said one of the marine officers operating on the front. "When the first reports appeared about enemy groups in Shakhove [at that time a rear village, east of the salient], we viewed them as the higher headquarters presented them: 'oh well, nothing serious, don't worry'."

When asked how it happened that the Russians managed to break through so deep into the rear, most of our sources working on the Dobropillia salient pointed to the following problems:

• huge gaps between positions, caused by a shortage of personnel in the units holding the defence on this front, especially in the 14th Chervona Kalyna Brigade
• the absence of a cohesive defence system, in particular the lack of drone surveillance of distant positions
• the prolonged concealment of the real situation and the painting of a picture in which "everything is fine".

Several of our sources placed special emphasis on the last point. At such moments, we again caught ourselves feeling as if the story was not about the breakthrough towards Dobropillia, but about Pokrovsk, where isolated Ukrainian soldiers were trapped because accurate information about the situation was missing.

For example, in this report, a drone operator from the 68th Brigade who goes by the alias "Horyn" explained that he had to retreat urgently from his position because the Russians had wiped out a neighbouring mortar unit.

"Marchenko [then commander of the Pokrovsk Tactical Group] did everything to sell the story that the enemy was infiltrating deep with numerous sabotage and reconnaissance groups – that's what they call a f***ed-up front. Infiltration," says one of our sources from the command and observation post on the Dobropillia front.

"On the one hand, this was true – they did use this tactic," the source added. "But on the other hand, when you have fewer forces in your rear than the enemy, it turns out that we are the sabotage and reconnaissance groups here, not them. There are 30 of us, and behind us are God knows how many of them."

One of the officers who served under Marchenko in the Donetsk Operational Tactical Group told Ukrainska Pravda: "From the very start in the Donetsk Operational Tactical Group, where he was deputy to Lutsenko and later Tarnavskyi [currently Marchenko is deputy commander of the Donetsk Operational Tactical Group under Viktor Nikoliuk], Marchenko had this fixation called 'nothing critical'. He never listened to the commanders, which led to personnel losses. He did not report the actual situation, but what the commander-in-chief wanted to hear."

Meanwhile, two other commanders who worked with Marchenko when he was a commander of the Pokrovsk Tactical Group were less critical in their assessments. One brigade commander noted that Marchenko's role, despite the questions and grievances directed at him, was hardly decisive in the loss of such a vast piece of territory. According to the military hierarchy, under him were around two dozen brigade and unit commanders, and above him stood the Donetsk Operational Tactical Group under Viktor Nikoliuk, the Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group under Mykhailo Drapatyi, and the commander-in-chief.

Another battalion commander stated that, in general, he was satisfied with working with Marchenko – the latter always asked for his opinion and took it into account.

Ukrainska Pravda attempted to contact Marchenko to ask for his view of the Dobropillia breakthrough, but he did not respond to our message.

The DeepState map update revealed a 10-km Russian breakthrough as far as Zolotyi Kolodiaz. After this, the catastrophic nature of the situation could no longer be ignored. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, allocated additional reserves for "detecting and eliminating sabotage and reconnaissance groups infiltrating beyond the defence line".

Thus, in mid-August, the term "Dobropillia front" entered the public, though still unofficial, military communication (it does not yet exist in the General Staff's reports).

Interestingly, the first to use it was the commander-in-chief himself as early as 28 June: "Fighting continues on a new front – Dobropillia". That is, the threat of a Russian advance towards what had once been a city in the rear, home to at least 20,000 civilians and military personnel, had already emerged two months before the breakthrough.

Initially, however, Syrskyi mentioned the fighting on the Dobropillia front as a threat to Kostiantynivka. Now the stakes have risen in proportion to the salient itself – the Russians are reaching not only for Kostiantynivka but also for neighbouring Druzhkivka (see the map below). The Russians are 16 km away from Druzhkivka, where the mandatory evacuation of children has been ongoing for a month, and Russian first-person view (FPV) drones strike there regularly.

Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka are two of the four cities in the Kramatorsk area, the backbone of Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast.

Successful counteroffensive actions

Counteroffensive actions on the Dobropillia salient began even before the DeepStateMap update, from approximately the end of July. They mainly involved the best forces already operating in this area – Syrskyi's assault units (the 425th Skelia [Rock] Regiment, the 1st Separate Assault Regiment and others), as well as air assault forces (in particular the 82nd and 79th brigades).

Later, among other reinforcements to counter the attacks, part of the 93rd Kholodnyi Yar Brigade was deployed, alongside the 225th Assault Regiment, redeployed from Sumy Oblast, which is also under Syrskyi's command.

As far as we understand, the first counterattacks by Ukraine's defence forces were meant to push the Russians away from the Dobropillia-Pokrovsk road, which passes through Bilytske and Rodynske. The road itself has long been impassable, but it provides a solid line for holding back the Russians (the reference point being the village of Nykonorivka). Subsequent counterattacks were aimed at blocking the northern edge of the salient (the villages of Zolotyi Kolodiaz, Vesele and Hruzke) to prevent it from expanding northwards. Finally, the last counterattacks were designed to "bite off" the salient from several directions in order to eliminate it altogether.

At present, judging by DeepState mapping data and our own observations, Ukraine's defence forces are attempting to cut the salient at the level of the villages of Razine-Novotoretske. On the overall scale of the salient, this is roughly its midpoint.

Let us highlight a few features of these assault actions (at times, it must be stressed, they were brilliant):

1) Ukraine's defence forces fought, and continue to fight, on the Dobropillia salient not against Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, but against Russian infantry. In footage from Ukraine's 1st Separate Assault Regiment, which was defending Nykonorivka, one can clearly see how the regiment fought against Russian forces backed by artillery and drones – while the regiment itself deployed armoured combat vehicles and a tank.

The fact that Russian infantry were driven out has been confirmed both by Ukrainska Pravda and by Denys Bryzhatyi, commander of the 150th Separate Reconnaissance and Strike Battalion. His battalion was among those that, in the early days of August, repelled and mopped up the northern part of the salient: the settlements of Hruzke, Vesele and Zolotyi Kolodiaz.

After capturing their first prisoner, the 150th Battalion learned about Russian plans – to push as far north as possible – and set up an ambush.

"These were not sabotage groups but regular service members – infantry advancing forward," says Bryzhatyi. "Mostly, they moved in groups of ten. Within a week, with the help of neighbouring units and aerial reconnaissance, we destroyed up to an assault company [120 men]. We struck them all along their route, from the moment they dismounted. Only one or two ever reached the positions."

2) One of the units that took part in the early stage of the counteroffensive told UP that these actions were "fruitless". After the assaults, the Ukrainian soldiers would enter positions that were encircled by the Russian troops.

"It was a deliberate leading of people into encirclement, without building a coherent defensive platform," noted the chief of staff of one unit in a comment to UP.

Later, the situation partly improved.

3) Interestingly, the counteractions involved not only people but also robots – more precisely, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Heavy equipment was also used, which is a rare occurrence in the era of FPV drone warfare.

The 93rd Brigade, during the assault on Vesele, deployed two tanks, which at point-blank range – from several dozen metres – destroyed Russian shelters. And for the first time, they used a ground drone not for resupply or evacuation, but for combat.

A machine gun and loudspeaker were mounted on the platform: the machine gun was shooting at the Russian shelters, while a voice from the loudspeaker urged Russian troops to surrender and save their lives (though none accepted the offer).

Such use of tanks and UGVs was possible on the first day of the counterattack because the Russians had not yet deployed FPV drones, explained Vitalii Piasetskyi, a senior sergeant (NATO equivalent OR-7) at the 93rd Brigade. The following day, however, Molniya drones and conventional FPVs were launched against them.

"The tasks we were given were lightning-fast – classic warfare of 2022-2023," says Piasetskyi with nostalgia, as do many soldiers who fought before the FPV-dominated phase of the war.

Continuing with the use of unmanned ground vehicles, the Svoboda Battalion, which drove the Russians out of Nykonorivka, employed a ground drone to evacuate a prisoner. A 61-year-old Russian, hands bound and blindfolded, was transported lying down for seven hours to a safe point. Had he gone on foot, his chances of survival would have been much lower, Svoboda fighters told UP.

4) In the public discourse, the Azov corps regularly reports on successful counteractions on the Dobropillia salient – for example, saying Ukraine's defence forces have taken a new group of prisoners, or that the village of Pankivka has been cleared.

This sometimes provokes resentment in other units operating on this front.

Firstly, Azov only sent its corps headquarters here – the Azov Brigade itself continues to hold the line on the neighbouring Toretsk front.

Secondly, Ukrainska Pravda has found that the tasks for assault units and airborne troops, who play a key role in the counteractions, are set by Air Assault Forces commander Oleh Apostol and directly by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, who is continually visiting units and often takes the management of situations into his own hands.

On the one hand, it must be acknowledged that, at least in the case of the Dobropillia salient, Syrskyi's interventions have produced rapid and positive results: Ukraine's defence forces, including the сommander-in-сhief's reserve, have recently been retaking and clearing villages from the Russians regularly.

On the other hand, most of UP's sources for this piece are convinced that such hands-on management undermines the сommander-in-сhief's own doctrine of building corps and maintaining other military command bodies, notably the Joint Forces commanded by Mykhailo Drapatyi, and Operational Command Skhid (East), commanded by Dmytro Bratishko, among others.

"A problem arises – the commander-in-chief arrives, asks what you need, then says: 'I'll give you this and that'," fumes one colonel familiar with the situation on the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia fronts. "Afterwards, he sends his assault units. Sometimes they cannot complete the mission they were given, because it was planned for the day Syrskyi visited. And the situation is constantly changing!

His trips do not improve things, because there is no strategy [for conducting the war]. The creation of corps is generally untimely; no one is commanding their own units."

5) Despite active and successful counteractions by Ukraine's defence forces on the Dobropillia salient, as of mid-September, it has not been possible to cut off or fully block the salient. Much of the salient remains a grey zone. On maps seen by UP, Ukrainian positions are literally interspersed with Russian ones, and vice versa.

"There are gaps, unprotected strips of forest through which the enemy moves towards Bilytske, Novyi Donbas, which is 1.5 km from Dobropillia," says an intelligence officer from a unit deployed on the Dobropillia salient. "It's a mess: we end up operating in the same 10-km zone as the enemy.

Our group will move in, sit there for two weeks, and then what? A soldier will want to eat and needs something to shoot with. We urgently need to reinforce our flanks, deploy our firepower and not get dragged further into the middle of this salient."

"All those triumphant statements are about 30% true – I don't know why Zelenskyy and Syrskyi say this," a colonel familiar with the matter told Ukrainska Pravda. "Maybe they don't have the situation under control. There is no continuous line anywhere on this salient. Our successes are exaggerated. But on the other hand, the Russians are losing a lot here, because they have got into a 'pocket' [found themselves pinched between Ukrainian positions]."

The Russians continue to mass in the north of the salient – in Kucherivyi Yar – and to assault towards Zolotyi Kolodiaz, Vesele and Hruzke. This is a "branch" from which advances could be pushed towards Druzhkivka.

What is needed to really change the situation on the Dobropillia salient and save Pokrovsk

The reason Ukraine's defence forces cannot fully cut off the Dobropillia salient lies in the activity and effectiveness of Russian drones – they cut off and control the supply routes.

The Russian unit "Rubicon" is targeting Ukrainian logistics at a range of 15-20+ km, shooting down reconnaissance aircraft operating at long range and heavy bombers supplying combat units with ammunition and provisions.

We spoke to a unit whose heavy bomber UAVs were all knocked out at one point – and overnight, they still needed to carry out some 20 flights just to drop provisions and ammunition.

Adjacent units do not always agree to take on that role, because, firstly, they risk losing their own bomber, and secondly, they will not get the e-scores for this work. [E-scores is an internal scoring system in the Ukrainian Armed Forces used to track soldiers' frontline service and performance, influencing pay, leave and career incentives – ed.]

"Therefore, finding and striking the Rubicon operators is every pilot's dream," one of the aerial reconnaissance specialists working on the Dobropillia salient, who has been there since May, told UP, sharing the unit's frustration.

If take-off points for Russian drones are not effectively neutralised, it is impossible to cut the Dobropillia salient completely and hold it stably.

The kill zone on Ukraine's side of the defence lines is at least five kilometres deeper than on the Russian side – they can target Ukrainian logistics more aggressively and position their pilots closer to the line of contact.

"Yes, our assault units go in," explains an officer in a marine infantry brigade operating on the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia fronts. "The idea is fine, but nobody does anything about Rubicon. The infantry go on foot because vehicles cannot get in, but then they have no proper drone support because the drone crews cannot get close enough and cannot bring fuel. The lads from the 79th who came in tell us it's worse here than on the Kursk front."

"We need units from the Unmanned Systems Forces that will not be just killing infantry on the front line [a rebuke aimed at the renowned brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Magyar's Birds], but will be striking enemy pilots," the officer adds. "We need corps-level units to work specifically on the wings, on logistic routes, on the forward edge. These are different echelons of work – a whole tactic.

But nobody does this because it's hard, because of electronic warfare and so on. It's easier to do PR and gain the e-scores. We are not solving the key problem, do you see? We knew Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad would be encircled, but we did not foresee it being a drone encirclement," the officer said with anger and frustration.

There have already been successful examples of wiping out Russian drone pilots at the front. But so far, this has not been scaled up.

In early July, Department of Active Operations of Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) released footage showing extensive strikes on Russian drone operator positions on the Zaporizhzhia front. UP has found that the campaign involves systematically collecting intelligence on Russian launch and recovery sites and on places where pilots stay, then striking those locations until they are destroyed.

Upon identification of a launch site for Supercam wing-type drones, all Ukrainian formations operating nearby engage the site with assets at their disposal. DIU footage shows Ukraine is willing to use even HIMARS missiles and aerial bombs for these kinds of tasks.

Over a month of operations, the DIU's department, together with adjacent units, identified 90 positions and locations of Russian pilots in this way, and destroyed or damaged 42 of them.

All the attention – from both the military leadership and society in general – has recently been on the Dobropillia salient. However, the units holding the "classic Pokrovsk front" – in Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad and south of those towns – are finding themselves in an increasingly difficult position each day.

Unfortunately, after the summer mop-up operations, the Russians have re-entered Pokrovsk. Krasnyi Lyman, south of Rodynske, has been captured, and Rodynske itself is close to being semi-encircled.

In effect, the Russians are successfully repeating the Kursk-style scenario on the Pokrovsk axis – they are deliberately targeting logistics. Some Ukrainian troops are already travelling to positions on foot for 10-20-25 km, as happened on the Kursk front. This is physically extremely demanding and is impossible to continue for much longer.

While this piece was being prepared, one of our sources operating on the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia fronts lost a pilot under his command. After a month at his post, the pilot left on foot and was killed by a remotely-controlled landmine.

"Reports speak of liberation, but at the same time losses are occurring elsewhere on this axis… the routes to Myrnohrad are slowly melting away, as we predicted," says the company commander who lost his pilot.

"The sky is theirs, so all logistics are on foot, and that's 20 km," an officer from the 68th Brigade, which holds Pokrovsk and the area to its rear, told UP in a voice message. "Re-supplying ammunition in these conditions is impossible. Ground robots are almost non-existent. If we give up Pokrovsk, what then? Another 20-km kill-zone."

"THE SKY IS THEIRS!," the officer added. "We do not control the air. Their pilots reconnoitre everything, then wipe it out with guided aerial bombs and artillery."

Author: Olha Kyrylenko, Ukrainska Pravda 
Translation: Anna Kybukevych and Yelyzaveta Khodatska
Editing: Shoël Stadlen